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EDITOR'S COMMENT
Bill Balthrop

As Editor of Speaker and Gavel I must extend my sincerest apologies
to the members of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha and to the readers
of this journal for the inordinate delay in this issue's publication. A com
bination of circumstances resulted in this delay and extensive efforts are
being made to minimize the possibility of such circumstances occurring
in the future. Each change in editors also produces certain alterations in

content, procedures and format. This shall be no different.
First, this and following issues will seek to address the varied interests
of the membership by encouraging submission and publication of manu
scripts addressing theoretical and pragmatic concerns to students and
scholars participating in forensics activities. Some of the most significant
statements in the development and refinement of debate theory have been
published in these pages and, with the changing directions of other pub
lications, Speaker and Gavel may once again serve this function. Debate,

however, should not be the sole benefactor of such efforts, and articles
exploring issues in individual events are encouraged equally.

Second, Speaker and Gavel welcomes suggestions for special issues
devoted to a more intensive examination of particular topics. Plans are
currently being made for a special issue exploring the challenges that
forensics has faced in the 1970's, how those have been met and which
remain. At the same time, the new challenges of the 1980's will be con
sidered. Any suggestions concerning which issues should be addressed or
about contributions to this issue should be forwarded to me immediately.
Further, if you have ideas for special issues, please forward them—along
with a brief statement ofjustification and potential contributors—to me as
well.

Third, an Editorial Board will be established for this journal. This board
will have for its primary responsibilities the solicitation and review of
manuscripts for publication. Such a procedure should help to reduce the
shortage of outstanding manuscripts submitted to this journal and, at the
same time, provide more exacting standards for scholarship in the forensics
community. A diverse collection of associate editors will ensure that all
areas and perspectives receive appropriate consideration.
And fourth, those who encounter books which they wish to review for
this journal should submit a letter indicating which books will be consid
ered and some justification for the review. I recognize that many other
journals, even those servicing the forensics community, provide reviews;
but it is hoped that the perspective taken in these pages will be oriented
toward this particular membership.
While these changes mark some departure from previous editorial pol
icies, they should not be viewed as diminishing the importance of "tra-
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ditional" features of Speaker and Gavel. The "Current Criticism" section
of the journal will be encouraged and, hopefully, remain as prominent and
valuable as before. While not placed within a separate area, the article by
Kane and Weiler printed in this issue demonstrates the vitality of criticism
and its importance in promoting the goals of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa
Alpha. Further, statements reflecting the philosophies of prominent forensics programs will continue to make a strong contribution to this journal.
Finally, Speaker and Gavel will continue to serve as a record of the activ
ities of the organization although it is hoped that this function will take up
relatively less space as greater numbers of manuscripts are received and
published.
All manuscripts for publication should be submitted in three copies and
should subscribe to the MLA Style Sheet, Second Edition. A title page—
or cover sheet—should indicate manuscript title, the author and his/her
position. All manuscripts will he submitted to a policy of blind reviewing
and all indications of author's identity, affllitation and position will be
removed. It is hoped that all reviews will be returned to the editor not
more than four weeks later and authors will be notifled accordingly. Manu
scripts cannot be returned after submission. Once a manuscript has been
accepted for publication, all footnotes and references will be verified for
substantive and stylistic accuracy. Any questions concerning references
will be forward to the author for clarification and will be resolved to the

editor's satisfaction before publication.
I genuinely hope that we can be back on an appropriate publication
schedule within a twelve month period while still maintaining a journal
of which all can be proud. Despite the efforts of this editorial staff, how
ever, this journal's ultimate worth rests upon the forensic community in
general and upon the membership of DSR-TKA in particular. With your
cooperation. Speaker and Gavel can continue the efforts and contributions
of those who edited this journal in the past and maintain a standard for
those who follow.
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TRUMAN AND THE A-BOMB DECISION:
A RESPONSE TO J. M. WILLIAMS
Thomas Kane and Richard M. Weiler

In the Summer 1978 issue of Speaker and Gavel, J. M. Williams ad
vances two theses regarding President Harry S. Truman's decision to drop

the atomic homhs on Japand She argues first, that "Truman's role as pres
idential decision-maker was one of passive acquiescence," and of "blind
allegiance to the views of Franklin Roosevelt, and to the views of those
of FDR's advisors held-over to the Truman administration; and second,
that"a rhetoric ofincrementalism" characterized the decision-making pro
cess throughout the period of the atomic bomb's development and even
tual use.

We will discuss these theses in turn, noting in the former case that
Williams presents an incomplete and distorted view of Harry S. Truman
as decision-maker; and in the latter, that "a rhetoric ofincrementalism" is,
in her treatment, a vague and confusing conception, ill-suited to a mean
ingful critique of the decision-making process which resulted in the Hi
roshima and Nagasaki bombings.

Our object will not be to assess the wisdom of Truman's decision, hut
rather to establish him as a rational and sober decision-maker, sensitive to
the awful significance of his decision, and by no means the irresponsible
abdicator that Williams suggests. Certainly, the charge that Truman al
lowed tens of thousands of Japanese to he killed by default is a serious
accusation of criminal negligence, and one that should he accepted only
on the basis of compelling evidence. We submit that a careful reading of
the admittedly fragmentary evidence available to the critic will render
such a charge baseless.
Thesis I

Williams' portrait of Truman as decision-maker relies heavily on Martin
J. Sherwin's A World Destroyed—The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alli
ance.'' Using recently opened British and American government docu
ments, as well as previously available material, Sherwin attempts to draw
and secure the links between the policies of the Truman administration
regarding the atomic bomb, and those of its predecessor. Franklin D. RooThomas Kane is Associate Professor of Speech at the University of Pittsburgh.
Richard M. Weiler is Assistant Professor of Oral Communication at Baylor Univer
sity.

'J. M. Williams,"Truman and the A-Bomb Decision: The Rhetoric of Incremen

talism, Speaker and Gavel, 15(Summer 1978), pp. 71—78. Those acquainted with
the literature on the atomic bomb controversy as it relates to Japan and later the
cold war will very quickly notice Williams' use of the evidence to be careless. In

twenty-seven instances, at least, she has used the words of others as though they
were her own. While our intent in writing this essay was to disagree with her
conclusions regarding Truman's decision to drop the bomb and that remains the
focal point of this article, we feel compelled to indicate to our readers the unfor
tunate use of research material by J. M. Williams.
^ Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed—The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Al

liance (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975).
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sevelt. He argues that Roosevelt's actions, while not wholly deterministic
of Truman's, were far more consistent with them than other historians have
supposed.' While admitting that Roosevelt's recorded statements regard
ing postwar atomic policy were few and inconclusive, Sherwin claims that
his actions reflected "the assumption that the bomb could ,be used to se
cure postwar goals; and this assumption was carried over to Truman's
administration."'' The postwar goals to which Sherwin refers are mainte
nance of the Anglo-American monopoly of the atomic bomb, and the use
of that monopoly, in James F. Byrne's words,"to make the Russians more
manageable in Europe,"' and, presumably, elsewhere.
On the question ofthe wartime, as opposed to postwar, use ofthe atomic
bomb, Sherwin has less to say. His thorough search of available documents
reveals only one statement, and a carefully qualified one, of FDR's inten
tions regarding use of the bomb against our wartime enemies. It is con
tained in an aide-memoire composed jointly with Prime Minister Winston
Churchill on September 18, 1944, and says that "when a 'bomb' is finally
available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the
Japanese..

Williams is interested only in Sherwin's analysis of Truman's decision
to drop the bomb on Japan. Here, she relies on the well-known evidence
ofTruman's lack of preparedness for the Presidency, particularly in foreign
affairs. "Lacking any policies of his own," she says, "he had little alter
native" but to follow those of his predecessor.'' This is a confusing argu
ment, because as we have seen, Roosevelt had no definite policies regard-,
ing the dropping of the bomb on Japan. His only pronouncement on the
subject suggested cautiously that "it might perhaps" be dropped, but only
"after mature consideration." For unstated reasons, Williams believes that
this statement "early predicts a gain in momentum for the decision to use
the bomb." Even if this were true, however, Truman did not know of the
statement at the time he made his decision, so it could not have been
delimiting in any way.®
Roosevelt's views on-dropping the bomb were unknown to Truman at
the time he was supposedly demonstrating blind allegiance to them and
were indefinite in any case. Sherwin emphasizes FDR's tendency to keep
secret his diplomatic maneuvering and his thinking on atomic energy is
sues.® Even his closest advisors were ill-informed. Thus, when Truman
sought the advice of these men, they were speaking for themselves, not
for any pre-existing policy. Daniel Yergin in Shattered Peace has de
scribed the very different foreign policy assumptions of Roosevelt and of
those of his advisors who played a significant role in shaping policy in the
early years of the Truman administration.'" Yergin's distinction rests on
the more intensely anti-Soviet orientation of those advisers. Of course, this
relates more to matters of postwar policy than to policy in wartime, but it
" Ibid., pp. 145-146.
^ Ibid., p. 6.
'
Louis Morton,"The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Foreign Affairs, Jan
uary 1957, p. 347.
® Sherwin, p. 284.
'
Williams, p. 73.
® Sherwin, p. 144.
Mbid., pp. 37-38.
Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace (Boston: Houghton MifHin Company, 1977),
pp. 84-86.
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denies the general link between foreign policy in the Roosevelt and Tru

man administrations. Where Sherwin is most successful in establishing
such a link is in the limited context of Roosevelt's tendency to resist pol
icies that would encourage Russian participation in the development and
control of atomic weapons during and after the war. Whether Truman con

tinued this policy uncritically, is certainly debatable," but assuming he
did, the link to Roosevelt is at least defensible. Truman's deicision to drop
the the bomb, by contrast, cannot be linked to Roosevelt's views on the
basis of the available evidence.

The evidence that Williams uses to connect Truman's decision to Roo
sevelt's "policy leaning" is inadequate for the task and illustrates for an

historian the pitfalls of playing too loosely with context. She quotes Gen
eral Groves, the military commander of the Manhattan Project, as
describing Truman as "a little boy on a toboggan," carried away by the

force^ of events." It is unclear how this statement implies a reliance on
FDR's policies regarding the atomic bomb or anything else. She footnotes

Bernstein and Matusow's The Truman Administration, A Documentary
History, who, unfortunately, do not tell use where they found Grove's
comment." In his memoir of the Manhattan Project, however. Groves does

discuss specifically Truman's decision to drop the bomb. After noting the
opposition of some Manhattan Project scientists to using the bomb against
Japan, Groves observes;

President Truman knew of these diverse and conflicting opinions. He
must have engaged in some real soul-searching before reaching his final
decision. In my opinion, his resolve to continue with the original plan will
always stand as an act of unsurpassed courage and wisdom—courage be
cause, for the first time in the history of the United States, the President '
personally determined the course ofa major military strategical and tactical
operation for which he could be considered directly responsible
(Ital
ics ours)

Groves reference to Truman's "resolve to continue with the original plan"
does suggest a presumption in favor of using the bomb once it became

available. But Groves description ofTruman's role also suggests that going
ahead with that plan was a separate and carefully considered decision, not
just a blurred landmark that Truman s toboggan passed on its dizzying
descent.

From Groves, Williams moves to Churchill's reference to the "deadly
hiatus created by the combination of FDR's deteriorating health and
eventual death, and by the succession of the ill-prepared Harry Truman.
"In this melancholy void," says Churchill, "one President could not act
and the other could not know."" A careful reading of the section of
Churchill's memoirs from which this passage is taken reveals that it relates
not to the decision to drop the bomb, but to the perceived failure of Amer
ican foreign policy to contain adequately "Russian imperialism and the
"Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control
Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), pp. 9293.

"Williams, p. 73.

"Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, eds.. The Truman Administration:

A Documentary History (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 2.

"Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project
(New York; Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 266.
"Williams, p. 73.

Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato,
7 2018

Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL

Communist creed," at war's endd® As Daniel Yergin, Walter LaFeber and
others have argued, however, Truman's sensitivity to the Russian threat
after World War II was enough greater than Roosevelt's to constitute a
substantial departure from the Roosevelt policy of emphasizing friendly
relations with Russia." Again, Truman's alleged dependence on Rooseveltiari precedent evaporates.
Williams quotes the memoirs of Admiral William D. Leahy who tells us
that Truman assured his associates that "commitments already entered
into must be upheld."" Since no commitment to drop the bomb had ac
tually been made, this statement is irrelevant to that decision. Moreover,
the Leahy recollections reveal that Truman made the comment in direct
response to a question "concerning food distribution between the different
zones of occupation in Germany."" There is no indication here that Tru
man intended his support of previous commitments to extend beyond this
specific issue. In his memoirs, Truman does state more generally that "it
was my intention to continue,both the foreign and domestic policies ofthe
Roosevelt Administration." But he adds that "I made it clear, however,
that I would be President in my own right and that I would assume full
responsibility for such decisions as had to be made."^" Given the indefiniteness of Roosevelt's atomic homh policy, and given the quite different
circumstances of the development, as opposed to the use of the atomic
bomb, we~can assume reasonably that Truman's decision partook more of
the independence shown hy the second remark than of the dependence
of the first.

This brings us to Williams' claim that Truman's decision was "charac
terized by strict. .•. adherence to the advice of seasoned counsellors who
surrounded him as Roosevelt's appointees.
Williams states that "one
conclusion that emerges clearly from a close examination of wartime policy
formulation is that policy makers never seriously questioned the assump
tion that the bomb should be used."^^ Gertainly, during the time of the
homb's development, this was true. Until this weapon was an accom
plished fact, what need was there to "seriously question" the assumption
of its use? As Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson wrote later,"we were at
war, and the work must be done."^^ But to say that virtually unanimous
agreement existed on the use of the bomb does not imply necessarily a
lack of consideration of the larger questions involved. As Stimson added,
"all of us of course understood the terrible responsibility involved in our
attempt to unlock the doors to such a devastating weapon; President Roo
sevelt particularly spoke to me many times of his own awareness of the
catastrophic potentialities of our work."^'* No doubt, this awareness is what
"Winston Churchill, Triumpth and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Com
pany, 1953), pp. 455^56.
"Yergin, pp. 87-91; and Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War,
1945-1966(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 21-36.
"William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 349;
and Williams, p. 73.
Leahy, p. 349.
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume I: Year of Decisions (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1955), p. 9.
"Williams, p. 72.
Ibid., p. 74.
Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's, Feb
ruary 1947, p. 98.
"Ibid.
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led Roosevelt to suggest cautiously that the bomh "might perhaps" be
used,"after mature consideration."

That Tmman was heavily dependent for information and counsel on

Roosevelt's foreign policy advisors cannot be contested. Lacking broad
experience himself in foreign affairs, Truman did "the only thing he
could accepting ideas formulated by those around him, then acting on
them as his instinct, personality and the situation dictated."^^
mean, as Williams contends, that his "role was reduced to little more than

a ceremonial function;"^® that his was "decision by default?"" We contend

that this is a vast oversimplification of the decision-making process in Tru
man's early years as president.

Williams observes that during this time, Truman "tried to appear deci
sive, hut she implies that this was a facade behind which cowered a

hesitating and frightened man.^* There is considerable evidence, however,
that from the day he took over the presidency, Truman was, in fact, de
cisive. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew reported on May 2, 1945, less

than one month into Truman s presidency that when I saw him today
... I had fourteen problems to take up with him and got through them in
less than fifteen minutes with a clear directive on every one of them. You
can imagine what a joy it is to deal with a man like that

Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace noted much the same phenornenon in meetings with Truman in late April and early May:"Truman's

decisiveness is admirable and He also seemed eager to make decisions
of every kind with the greatest promptness. Everything he said was de
cisive."^' Wallace added cautiously, however,"The only question is as to
whether he has enough information behind his decisiveness to enable his
decision to stand up.""

This is more to the point. The issue is not really one of Truman's temP^tament as decision-maker as much as one of the quality and sources of
information upon which he based his decisions. Here, Williams makes two
points regarding the informational inputs of the atomic bomb decision.

First, she notes that the advisors upon whom Truman relied most,"Stimson, Leahy and Marshall, were obsessed with the military rather than the

political implications of the war."" Second, Williams mentions the reports
of various ad hoc policy advisory bodies, including the Frank Report, the
Szilard Petition, the reports of the Interim Committee, and Science'Ad
visory Panel as examples of dissenting views that either never reached the
President, or reached him in distorted form."

Williams list of Truman's most relied-on advisors is open to question.
Charles Mee in Meeting at Potsdam agrees with the choice of Leahy, but
names Secretary of State James F. Byrnes as at least as important in shaping
Yergin, p. 73.
Williams, p. 74.
"Ibid.

Ibid., p. 73.

Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman
1945-1948 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1977), p. 20.

"John Morton Blum, ad.. The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace,

1942-1946 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973) n 440
"Ibid., p. 437.
"Blum, pp. 440^41.
"Williams, p. 73.
"Ibid., p. 74.
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Truman's thinking on foreign policy.'^ Quincy Howe's Ashes of Victory
also stresses Byrnes' role.^® Daniel Yergin names Churchill and Harriman,
the two men whose influence Williams specifically discounts, as two of
the four most influential in the first months of the Truman presidency

(Leahy and the then Secretary of State Edward Stettinius are the other
two)." These diverging views suggest the difficulty of assigning accurate
weights to the advice of those involved in the' decision-making process.
Of course, if all of them gave Truman the same advice, then the degree
to which he relied on each is irrelevant. In fact, among the three advisors
Williams names, there was far from complete agreement on atomic energy

matters; and certainly, there was no obsession with the military implica
tions of the war, at least as regards the use of the atomic bomb. Quincy

Howe notes that from the first, Leahy was sceptical of the chances for the
Manhattan Project's success.^® More significantly, even after the success
of the project was assured, Leahy urged Truman to drop the demand that
Japan surrender unconditionally, in hopes that further American military
action could be avoided.®" Some historians have argued since that had the
Allied leaders taken this advice, Japan would indeed have surrendered
prior to Hiroshima.^"
As for Stimson and Marshall, we have Stimson's testimony that "both
General Marshall and I ... expressed the view that atomic energy could

not be considered simply in terms of military weapons but must also be
considered in terms of a new relationship of man to the universe."'*' Nei
ther of these men dissented from the decision to drop the bomb, but there

is enough evidence of their concerns over the whole range of the bomb's
implications to discount the notion that they suffered from a military ob
session. Stimson, in fact, sent a memo to the President on July 2, 1945,
urging that an advance warning of the bomb's use be given to Japan,,in
the hope that she would capitulate out of fear of its potential effects.'*®
Williams' second argument concerning Truman's access to information
assumes a filtering process which denied Truman the views of those who

opposed dropping the bomb, or at least distorted them in some way. She
cites Sherwin,and Bernstein and Matusow. These sources do discuss some
informational gate-keeping; but the only instance they document in which
information was actually blocked from Truman's access until after Hiro
shima was that of the petition signed by Leo Szilard and other atomic
scientists urging the President to use the bomb only after the Japanese
had been informed of its destructive potential and given adequate time to

respond, and only after all moral implications of the bomb's use had been
considered carefully.'*® Williams provides no evidence that other sources
of information were shut-off, nor does the Szilard petition incident mean

Charles L. Mee, Meeting at Potsdam (New York: M. Evans and Company,
1975), p. 4.

Quincy Howe, Ashes of Victory (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), pp.
378-379.

Yergin, pp. 73-79.
Howe, p. 400.

Ibid., pp. 400-401.

Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam(New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1965), pp. 176-177.
■" Stimson, p. 100.
''® Ibid., pp. 102-104.
Sherwin, pp. 217-218.
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necessarily that Truman was ignorant of the arguments against the bomb's
unannounced use. In fact, as Sherwin notes, the President met with Pro
fessor Ralph Bard, the lone dissenter from the report of the Interim Com
mittee urging the bomb's use, some two weeks before the bomb was
dropped. Bard did not oppose use, but like Szilard, argued that advance
notice should be given. Truman said "the matter of a warning had received
very careful attention,"^^ but declined to change course. Recall, also in this
connection. General Groves' claim that "President Truman knew of these
diverse and conflicting opinions," regarding whether to use the bomb at
all. In sum. President Truman does appear to have been aware of the

arguments of those who opposed use of the bomb or felt that its use should
be announced in advance. His failure to take these courses of action may
have resulted from a tendency to assign greater credibility to the opinions
of tlrose who favored unannounced use than those who opposed it, hut it
did not spring from ignorance.

What emerges from our discussion is a portrait of Harry Truman as de
cision-maker a good deal more complex and varied than the one Williams
paints. We contend that the atomic bomb policy leanings of Franklin Roo
sevelt, due to their inaccessibility and vagueness, had no appreciable ef
fect on Truman's decision to drop the bomb. We contend further, that
while Truman did rely heavily on the advice of Roosevelt's foreign policy
advisors, and while these men did unanimously favor tire use of the bomb,
their advice was not of one redundant voice but included concerns re

garding a broad range of political and moral issues. Finally, we contend,
that Truman was, by temperament, essentially a decisive man, conscious

of, though not convinced by, views opposed to those of his principal ad
visors and sensitive to the unique responsibilities of his office. He made
his decision as rationally as he could. Truman's decision to drop the bomb

on Japan may not have been decision-making's finest hour, but neither
was it characterized by blind allegiance or passive acquiesence.
Tfiesis II

Incremental decision-making as a critical concept applies to situations

in which the decision under analysis is merely the latest in a series of
decisions stretching over a relatively long period, aimed at solving the
same long-term problem. As Williams describes it, "a policy is directed at
a problem; it is tried, altered, tried in its altered form, altered again, and
so forth.

In the case of Truman's decision to drop the bomb, we might

define the problem as World War H, and the development and use of the
bomb as one approach among many for speeding that war to a conclusion.
Gertainly, both Roosevelt and Truman sought an end to the war, and thus
the decisions in the administration of each are part of the same incremental
process.

So far so good. But Williams tries to use the concept of incremental
decision-making in quite a different way. She sees the decision-making
process not as one in which Roosevelt and then Truman applied various
different potential solutions to the same problem, nor as one in which
solutions tried unsuccessfully by Roosevelt were altered, tried again, al
tered again, and finally tried successfully by Truman. Rather, Williams
uses the concept of incrementalism to stand for inertia. She sees Roose«Ibid., p. 217.
Williams, p. 75.
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velt's decision to develop the atomic bomb,more-or-less on the assumption
that it would be used, as determining Truman's decision to use it. No
incremental alterations in the original solution are noted. From initial de
velopment to use, the process is an inertial flow toward a predestined
result. "Thus use of the bomb," she says, "flowed out of the momentum
of events, out of the locked-in quality of men and institutions, who, once
committed, saw no way to rearrange their priorities and decisions."''® This

is hardly the flexible, experimental mode of decision-making that Braybrooke and Lindblom describe and argue for when they speak of incre
mental decision-making.^'
Williams emphasizes the alleged failure of Truman and his advisors to

consider "the moral and political impact which the bomb might generate
after the war."'" Truman, she argues, was biased "toward the more short
run and controllable elements of the equation."" She discusses the report
of the Interim Committee, and the apparent agreement of its members to
ignore the question of whether dropping the bomb could be avoided.
These scientists, like Truman's advisors, allowed "the use of the A-bomb
to become an end in itself."^" (Williams' Italics)
Perhaps this short-sightedness, this tendency to place wartime military
considerations above long-term political goals did afflict the Truman

administration. But we are left to guess what these ignored long-term goals
were and to what extent the decision to drop the bomb foreclosed them.
Williams observes enigmatically that "the final assessment of Truman's A-

bomb decision ... may remain largely a question of values."®' Undoubt
edly so! Certainly the question of how marty more lives, American and
Japanese, might have been lost had the bomb not been dropped, is a
value-laden one,and one that might be classed as having a "moral impact."
Significantly, it is a question that concerned Truman and his advisors pro
foundly.®^

As for the "political impact which the bomb might generate after the
war," there is abundant evidence that the question of how atomic energy
might affect postwar relations with the Soviet Union was an integral part
of the decision-making process. At least two well-known historians have

gone so far as to claim that the bomb was dropped primarily to impress
upon the Russians the importance of cooperating with the United States
in the postwar world.®® Others, while conceding that the bomb would not

have been dropped had impressing the Russians been Truman's only goal,
argue that this consideration contributed significantly to the decision to
use it against Japan.®^ Arthur Compton, a co-author of the Frank Report,
states in its covering letter that "if the bomb were not used in the present
war, the world would have^ho adequate warning as to what was to be
expected if war should break out again."®®
"Ibid.

"David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision: Policy
Evaluation as a Social Process (New York; The Free Press, 1970).
•'® Williams, p. 78.
Ibid., p. 75.
®»Ibid., p. 78.
®' Ibid.

Stimson, pp. 101-102; and Truman, pp. 416-419.

Alperovitz, pp. 229-232 and pp. 241-242; and P. M. S. Blackett, Fear, War,and
the Bomb (New York: Whittlesey House, 1949), pp. 136-138.
Sherwin, p. 225; and Morton, pp. 346-347.
®® Sherwin, p. 213.
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Thus, Truman and his advisors, as they approached those fateful days
in August 1945, were keenly aware of issues that transcended the imme

diate goal of subduing Japan. They may have misjudged those issues, but
they did not ignore them. Williams invokes incremental decision-making
to portray the decision-making process that produced the A-bomb decision

as one of inertia, of presidential abdication, and of moral and political
myopia. The concept she chooses is ill-suited to her mistaken purpose.
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Editor's Note: The reference by Professors Kane and Weiler to "careless"
use of evidence by J. M. Williams "Truman and the A-Bomb Decision:
The Rhetoric of Incrementalism," Speaker and Gavel, 15(Summer 1978)
is predicated upon incomplete quotation and citation in that article. Most
of those errors involve not indicating the extent to which Williams directly
cites the source, although the source is nearly always included in the
footnote. In an effort to foster the highest standards of scholarship, the
following corrections are provided to readers of this journal.
At the same time, it should be noted that J. M. Williams provided every
possible assistance in correcting these errors and requested that the fol
lowing statement be published:
"I sincerely hope that the corrections will demonstrate there was no malicious or
willful intent to indicate use of material without use of appropriate credit. There
was, however, a mishandling of direct quotations, an acutely distressing error on
my part and an incomprehensible oversight, for which I vigorously apologize to the
readers and editorial staff of Speaker and Gavel.
J. M. Williams"

Unless otherwise indicated, the following errors involve mishandling of
direct quotations.
1.
2.
3.
4.

page 71, fn. 1.
page 71, fn. 3.
page 71, fn. 4.
page 72, fn. 5. See Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic
Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), p.
150.

5. page 73, fn. 8.
6. page 73, lines 11-16. No fn. See Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presi
dency, The History of a Triumphant Succession (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 52.
7. page 73, fn. 10.
8. page 73, fn. 12.
9. page 73, no fn. See Sherwin, pp. 147-148.
10. page 73, fn. 13.
11. page 73, fn. 14.
12. page 74, fn. 16.
13. page 74, fn. 17.
14. page 74, fn. 18.
15. page 74, fn. 22.
16. pages 74-75, fn. 23.
17. page 75, fn. 27.
18. page 75, fn. 28.
19. page 75, fn. 29.
20. page 75, fn. 30 and 31.
21. page 76, fn. 32.
22. page 76, fn. 33.
23. page 76, fn. 34.
24. page 76, lines 25-29, no fn. See Sherwin, p. 169.
25. page 76, fn. 36, 37, 38.
26. page 77, fn. 39.
27. page 77, fn. 40 and 41. ,
28. page 77, fn. 43, 44 and 45.
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ON THE CURRENT STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP IN
INDIVIDUAL EVENTS
Jack Rhodes

The decade of the seventies has witnessed an unprecedented growth in
intercollegiate individual events contests. Intercollegiate Speech Tour
nament Results reports that in the 1977-78 forensics season, the number

of college tournaments holding exclusively individual events competition

had risen to 28.6% of the total roster of tournaments, while those holding
both individual events and debate comprised another 35% of the total
number.' In the same volume. Jack Howe states:
In the course of these four seasons, 1974-75 through 1977-78, the num
ber of individual events opportunities in intercollegiate forensics increased
by 542, or a rousing 49%.^

It also seems significant that the Individual Events National Tournament
sponsored by the National Forensic Association ranks in the 1977-78 re

sults handbook as the largest tournament in the country on both lists, with
140 schools and 697 students participating, and that, in its very first year
of operation, the American Forensic Association's National Individual

Events Tournament attracted 59 colleges and 168 student participants."
With this impressive growth in participation and the emergence in this
decade of not one but two national tournaments in-individual events, I
think it suitable to examine the state of scholarship that has accompanied
this surge of interest. Lamentably, there is not very much to examine.
There have admittedly been sporadic attempts to give more permanence
to, say, the winning speeches from the national tournaments. The valuable

but short-lived/owrnal of the Forensics Exchange tried to provide a clear
ing house for the publication of speeches wbich the contributors deemed

noteworthy; and such publications as Speaker and Gavel, Forensic, and

the AFA Newsletter sometimes preserve the texts of championship ora
tions or extemporaneous speeches. These efforts, while laudable, have

typically been transitory and non-systematic. In any case, they do not meet
the definition of "scholarship" used in this paper because at their best
they normally value text reproduction per se and contain no analysis, crit
icism, evaluation, or comparative statements of any kind about the pre
served speeches.

With this definition of "scholarship" in mind, let me move to the con
sideration of what scholarship has taken place during the I970's in the
individual events area. It seems safe to say that virtually all of what has
been written or delivered at conventions has focused on the practical as
pects of competition. The intent of most ofthe authors has apparently been
to tell students and coaches how to do better in tournament competition.
A cursory examination of titles and quotations seems to support this ob
servation. In Speech Contest Activities, David Thomas states as his goal
Jack Rhodes is Director of Forensics at the University of Utah.
'Jack H. Howe, ed.. Intercollegiate Speech Tournament Results, Vol. XVII
(1977-1978)(Long Beach: Jack H. Howe, 1978), p. 106.
" Ibid., p. 107.
" Ibid., pp. 5, 7 and 92-94.
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for the book of essays "to help speech activities become more functional."''
As he and the other contributors continue through the various events under

discussion, a standard "chapter formula" appears which deliberately
places at least three-quarters of the emphasis in each chapter squarely on
pragmatics:

In discussing each contest event, I felt the chapter should include a
description of the meaning and usefulness of the event in terms of how it
relates to the world beyond the speech tournament; a description of the
mles of the event; practical recommendations for preparing contestants to
compete; and advice for judging the event.®

Accordingly, Speech Contest Activities provides many practical sugges
tions and generalized tips for both coach and contestant; there is, however,
very little space devoted to critical, historical, or empirical research which
might validate these guidelines or generate meaningful questions about
the events themselves. The emphasis is strongly on outlines, guidelines,
and samples.

Nor is there any significantly greater emphasis on scholarship in the
Individual Events chapter of Directing Forensics by Faules, Rieke, and
Rhodes.® It is true that the authors do provide an initial discussion of the
benefits which they believe uniquely derive from training in the individ
ual events and do make various other comments about the possible worth

of specific activities throughout the chapter.' But, again, the stress in this
chapter, as in the essays of Speech Contest Activities, is on pragmatics.
As far as individual events are concerned, both the pragmatic and the
theoretical considerations are virtually absent from Forensics as Com

munication, the published proceedings of the 1974 National Conference
on Forensics held at Sedalia, Colorado. While the proceedings do indeed
call for students to have the opportunity to participate in both debate and
individual events, the conference was clearly occupied with the concerns

of intercollegiate and high school debate to the point of de facto ignoring
individual events. Readers of the proceedings will perhaps recall the
"Definitional Statement" adopted by the Sedalia Conference:
Forensics is an educational activity primarily concerned with using an

argumentative perspective in examining problems and communcating with
people. An argumentative perspective on communication involves the
study of reason giving by people as justification for acts, beliefs, attitudes,
and values. From this perspective, forensics activities, including debate
and individual events, are laboratories for helping students to understand
and communicate various forms of argument more effectively in a variety
of contexts with a variety of audiences.®
Now it seems obvious to me that the Sedalia definition, in its insistence

on the "argumentative perspective," is a statement incompatible with vir
tually all individual events involving interpretation and that it is simply
an inappropriate model to use when examining what transpires in such
popular events as poetry, prose, or dramatic duo.
David A. Thomas, Speech Contest Activities (Springfield, Missouri: Mid-Amer
ica Research, 1976), p. 12.
® Ibid., pp. 8-9.
® Don F. Faules, Richard D. Rieke, and Jack Rhodes, Directing Forensics, 2nd
Edition (Denver; Morton Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 199-229.
'
Ibid., see especially pp. 199-203.
® James H. McBath, ed., Forensics as Communication (Skokie, Illinois: National
Textbook Company, 1975), p. 11.
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While it is not die province ofthis paper to explore such ancillary though
interesting questions as, How did the Sedalia Conference allow itself to

convene with so few good spokespersons for the burgeoning area of in

dividual events?," what can be observed, here, I think, is that—regardless
of the thinking of the conference—a great deal of work that occurs under

the heading of individual events has very little to do with an "argumen
tative perspective. I simply disagree with the Sedalia notion that the

communication to an audience ofKeats's The Eve ofSaint Agnes or Words

worth's Tintern Abbey relates in any meaningful way to the model of a
laboratory "for helping students to understand and communicate various

forms of argument more effectively." Lanier's The Marshes of Glynn or
Frost s Birches, beautiful examples of the American lyric poem, may of
course be forced onto the Procrustean bed of argumentative analysis in
this laboratory. But why should they be forced? We have no inherent

reasons for thinking that any greater appreciation or understanding, any
more useful insights, might result from this type of analysis. And certainly
the Sedalia conferees make no attempt in Forensics as Communication to

explain or defend the excellence or utility of their recommended "per
spective as applied to interpretation. Yet in 1977—78 intercollegiate tour
naments offered 426 contests described as "interpretation" and another

151 two-person acting or interpretation events." But whether one accepts
or denies the Sedalia perspective on individual events, it is incontrovert-

ibly true that Forensics as Communication spends extremely little time
discussing these events at all.

The full-scale books on forensics published since 1974, then, do not
seem to provide very much in the way of scholarship on the individual

events. Likewise, relevant articles in the scholarly journals appearing in

the seventies are few in number and only marginally scholarly. On its very
narrow topic, the 1973 article by B. W. Hope and Judith C. Hale raises
some pertinent questions about the style and the classification of the in

troductions used in contest orations. My own article in 1972 on the se
lection of materials for oral interpretation contests addresses a somewhat

theoretical, though admittedly narrow, question about the once-pervasive
tournament rule that insisted on thematic presentations for interpretation
contests." The most recent/AFA article on individual events, James Ben

son's 1978 piece on extemporaneous speaking, discusses the problem of
organizational patterns for extemporaneous speeches with an eye toward
developing "content criteria" to assistjudges in competitive evaluations.
Each of these articles, in its individual way, makes some contribution

toward theory-building in the individual events. Each is, it seems to me,
a step—albeit very small—in the right general direction. There is clearly,
however, much more to be done.

Before outlining a few of the items on the scholarly agenda, however,
let me say a word about programs concerning the individual events at the

national conventions: there have been virtually no such programs. At the
San Antonio convention of the Speech Communication Association and
" Howe, p. 107.

^ B. W. Hope and Judith C. Hale, The Introduction to the Contest Oration: Is
It Speech or Declamation ? , Journal of the American Forensic Association 9
(Winter 1973), pp. 367-370.

"Jack Rhodes, The Selection of Materials for Contests in Oral Interpretation,"
Journal of the American Forensic Association, 8(Winter 1972), pp. 135-138.
"James W. Benson, "Extemporaneous Speaking: Organization Which Inheres,"
Journal of the American Forensic Association, 14(Winter 1978), pp. 150-155.
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the American Forensic Association in November, 1979, there will in fact

be a program devoted to intercollegiate individual events. This program
is offered in response to numerous requests from the forensics community,
and I think it will be both interesting and successful. But its focus will

also be pragmatic rather than theoretical or scholarly, inasmuch as the
panelists will discuss whether the community needs two national tour
naments or just one in individual events. Hopefully, however, there will
now be a more or less permanent spot for an individual events panel at
the national convention; and in the future these panels may well wish to
turn their attention to more clearly scholarly inquiries.

If this summary of scholarly activity in individual events during the
seventies seems unduly bleak, let me observe on the positive side of the
ledger that there are some hopeful signs. These have already been men
tioned but perhaps bear review: the appearance of a separate book devoted
entirely to individual events, some modest continuing contributions in the

JAFA, and the appearance of a full panel on individual events at the last
SCA/AFA national convention of the decade. These developments are un

derscored, of course, by the surge of student participation in these activ
ities which we have been noting throughout this paper. And it may well
be that the scholarly output will soon naturally follow from this newlyfound base of student interest,just as, in debate, theory often races to keep
abreast of new tactics employed by imaginative debaters. Our task now,
therefore, is to develop a scholarly agenda, to begin to suggest a few ques
tions that might be researched and tested by those interested in the area.
At this stage the list is certainly not exhaustive; it is intended to be pre

liminary and to provoke more thought and discussion about the individual
events.

(1) Do the individual events have any genuine value as a part of the stu
dent's education? If so, can this value be quantified? What role do

training and coaching in individual events play in forensics education?
(2) Are there certain individual events which most appropriately relate to
certain educational goals? Which ones seem to relate to which goals?
How might the teacher most efficiently maximize the achievement of
these goals?

(3) What is the role of audience adaptation in individual events? Is it of
greater, less, or equal importarice with the role of audience adaptation
in intercollegiate debate? What methods, if any, can be used to teach
audience adaptation through individual events—if the instrument is
appropriate?

(4) What is the comparative desirability of competitive versus noncom-

petitive participation in individual events? Does either format offer a
better avenue for teaching individual events skills? Or are there spe
cific events which should be noncompetitive for maximum utility,
while others should be competitive?

These and other questions seem to afford a starting point for more in

quiry into the usefulness and value of individual events; and I think we
should address these questions, looking for honest answers, with the best
tools to be found in our discipline. Yet practically no empirical research
of which I am aware has focused on these events in which so many stu

dents and coaches spend a considerable part of their professional and cocurricular time and effort."

'A partial exception is the Ph.D. dissertation by David A. Williams, currently on
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I am at a loss to explain this cleartli of research. I know journal editors
and convention planners who ha\'e spent considerable energy trying to
solicit manuscripts and panels dealing with individual events; there clear
ly is a market for the publication and dissemination of individual events

research. The scarcity of research is also puzzling because our discipline
abounds in people welj-tjualifieil to undertake einirirical, critical, and his
torical research projects. And the American Forensic Association has.
through its research committee, demonstrated its willingness tt) receive
research proposals concerning individual events.'"'

At this point I hope enough has been saiti to provoke more discussion
atid t<j enctmrage interested scholars to take up the challenge of research
about the indi\'i<lual events. Our forensics communit\' clearl>' possesses
the j)eople, the tools, and the resources to set a research agenda and start
to move through it. It is my belief that the rewards of knowledge gaitied
will be well worth our collective efTorts.

the {acuity at the I'inversity ol Ariz<ina. coiiceming oral iiiteq)rt'tei's' responses to
amlipiuc ieeclhack and siibsecjuenf adaptation and enectiveness while reading Rob
ert Frost's "The Runaway." (I'npiiblished Ph.D. Dissertation. L'niversity of Utah
1971.)

"For an example ol Ah A-snpporte<l research in a situiiar vein, see Wayne N.
Thompson,"The Early History ofllie National Contest in Public Discussion." Com
munication Edtiralinn. 28(May 1979), pp. 104-109.
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Current Criticism

Individual copies of Current Criticism are available to readers of this

journal at a 20% discount. The special price will be $2.00 per copy
provided payment is sent with the order.

Current Criticism may be adopted as a text in courses in criticism and
contemporary public discourse. Examination copies are available on
request and discounts available on quantity orders.

Order from Bill Balthrop, Editor, Speaker and Gavel, Department of
Speech Communication. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC
27514 or Bert Gross, National Secretary, DSR-TKA, Department of
Speech Communication, Marshall University, Huntington, WV 27501.
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